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Abstract 
 
In May 2004 a conference was held at Cornell University entitled “75 Years of 
Development Research.”.1 Apart from the usual array of theoretical and empirical papers 
on development, a number of panels took stock of the state of development economics 
and discussed a range of methodological issues. One commentary that stood out in the 
challenge it posed to the current state of development economics was, “Is there Too Little 
Theory in Development Economics Today?” by Dilip Mookherjee. He answered his own 
question in the affirmative. Given the debate it generated, after the conference it was 
circulated to a number of leading development economists who had been present at the 
conference, and responses were invited. Pranab Bardhan sent in a response, “Theory or 
Empirics in Development Economics,” as did Kaushik Basu, “The New Empirical 
Development Economics: Remarks on its Philosophical Foundations.” These papers were 
largely supportive of the position taken by Mookherjee. There then followed a response 
to all three of these papers by Abhijit Banerjee, “‘New Development Economics’ and the 
Challenge to Theory,” which mounted a defense of the current empirical methods in 
development economics. Ravi Kanbur then followed with his comments, “Goldilocks 
Development Economics.” Ravi Kanbur also took the responsibility of coordinating the 
contributions. These five papers are being brought together here in this symposium in 
Economic and Political Weekly. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See conference website at http://www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/75devconf/home.html. It marked the 75th 
anniversary of the publication of Allyn Young’s classic paper on Increasing Returns, which some regard as 
the start of modern theorizing on development, “Increasing Returns and Economic Progress,” The 
Economic Journal, 1928, Volume 38, pp. 527-42. 
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Is There Too Little Theory in Development Economics Today? 
 
 
Dilip Mookherjee 
 
Revised, August 28, 2005 
 
 
Development economics is increasingly becoming an empirical discipline today. 
Where theory reigned during the 1980s and early 1990s, in the last ten years or so the 
primary research concerns have become increasingly driven by empirical and policy 
issues. In this essay I wish to reflect on the balance between theory and the rest in the 
discipline, thinking aloud about the question whether the pendulum has shifted away a bit 
too far, and whether there is need for some reorientation of the dominant research agenda 
or methodology.  
 
In the next section I will revisit classic ‘theory versus empirics’ debates involving 
some of the great 20th century economists, and distill from this a notion of alternative 
stages in the maturation of any given field of economics. Following this, I will attempt to 
place the evolution of methodology in development economics within this general 
scheme, in order to gain some perspective of where the field currently stands, and the role 
of theory at the current frontiers of research.   
 
Given the nature of this symposium, I will attempt to be brief and succinct, rather 
than embark on an expansive and scholarly essay. Accordingly I will eschew accuracy 
and detail for the sake of breadth and brevity. Indeed, I see this as an opportunity to air 
and thus clarify my own subjective views, and invite feedback from others. 
 
 
Classical ‘Theory versus Empirics’ Debates 
 
Regarding the appropriate balance between theory and empirics, the great 
economic thinkers of the first half of the 20th century had strikingly diverse views. In his 
preface to his monumental History of Economic Analysis, a thousand page historical 
account on the evolution of economic theory, Joseph Schumpeter expressed the judgment 
that the study of economic history and economic statistics should precede theory. At the 
other extreme John Maynard Keynes maintained a profoundly distrustful attitude towards 
statistics. Towards the beginning of his well-known review of Jan Tinbergen’s 
monograph on statistical testing of business cycle theories1, Keynes writes: 
 
“Prof. Tinbergen is obviously anxious not to claim too much. If only he is 
allowed to carry on, he is quite ready and happy at the end of it to go a 
long way towards admitting, with an engaging modesty, that the results 
                                                 
1 J.M. Keynes, “Professor Tinbergen’s Method’’, Economic Journal, Vol. 49, no 195 (Sept 1939), 558—
577. Review of A Method and its Application to Investment Activity, by Jan Tinbergen, Geneva: League of 
Nations, 1939. 
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probably have no value. The worst of him is that he is much more 
interested in getting on with the job than in spending time in deciding 
whether the job was worth getting on with. He so clearly prefers the mazes 
of arithmetic to the mazes of logic, that I must ask him to forgive the 
criticisms of one whose tastes in statistical theory have been, beginning 
many years ago, the other way around.” (p.559) 
 
He then goes on to list various possible sources of bias, which in the vocabulary 
of modern econometrics would translate into problems of omitted variables, errors in 
variables, multicollinearity, simultaneity, incorrect functional form, time lags, trend 
corrections, parameter instability, and problems in extrapolation. Gathering these 
together, he expresses his skepticism concerning the usefulness of regression analysis in 
the process of inference concerning the validity of theories: 
 
“Thirty years ago I used to be occupied in examining the slippery problem 
of passing from statistical description to inductive generalization in the 
case of simple correlation; and today in the era of multiple correlation I do 
not find that in this respect practice is much improved.” (p. 566) 
 
 The review ends thus: 
 
“I hope that I have not done injustice to a brave pioneer effort….I have a 
feeling that Prof. Tinbergen may agree with some of my comment, but that 
his reaction will be to engage another ten computers and drown his 
sorrows in arithmetic. It is a strange reflection that this book looks likely, 
as far as 1939 is concerned, to be the principal activity and raison d’etre 
of the League of Nations.” (p. 568) 
 
Fortunately Tinbergen did not give up, and neither did the fledgling field of 
econometrics, despite the rapid demise of the League of Nations. Tinbergen’s patient and 
detailed reply to Keynes reads like the rejoinder that any modern econometrician would 
probably have written. 2 Specifically, that many influences could be excluded from the 
estimated regression and collected as a residual, suitable assumptions regarding which 
would validate the inference, assumptions that can themselves be tested from the data; 
that multicollinearity is a only problem of degree not of kind; that nonlinear functional 
forms can be approximated by polynomials, and so on. The rejoinder hardly affected 
Keynes’ skepticism, whose subsequent reply ended by labeling econometrics as 
‘statistical alchemy’ rather than a science.3  
 
Yet it is undeniable that econometric analysis has progressed impressively since 
the time of the Keynes-Tinbergen debate, particularly with respect to combating the very 
problems that they discussed. The scientific status of econometrics is far less in doubt 
                                                 
2 J. Tinbergen, “On a Method of Statistical Business-Cycle Research. A Reply”, Economic Journal, Vol. 
50, no. 197 (March 1940), 141—154. 
3 J.M. Keynes, “On the Method of Statistical Business-Cycle Research. A Comment,” Economic Journal 
Vol. 50, no. 197 (March 1940), 154-156. 
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today, an issue argued persuasively by David Hendry in his inaugural lecture at the 
London School of Economics in 19804: 
 
“Forty years after Keynes wrote his review should still be compulsory 
reading for all who seek to apply statistical methods to economic 
observations. ….To Keynes’ list of problems, I would add stochastic mis-
specification, incorrect exogeneity assumptions …, inadequate sample 
sizes, aggregation, lack of structural identification and an inability to refer 
back uniquely from observed empirical results to any given initial theory. 
 
That the subject is exceedingly complicated does not entail that it is 
hopeless. Considerable progress has been made on the technical aspects, 
such as studying the consequences of the various problems just listed, 
designing means of detecting these, developing methods that mitigate 
some of their ill effects or handle several complications at once, and 
analyzing the properties of estimators when the sample size is 
small…Much of this technical work is essential background to 
understanding and correctly interpreting empirical findings and, although 
some work may have turned out to be otiose in retrospect, the ever 
increasing level of technique is not a symptom of alchemy.” (p. 396)  
 
I doubt that many economists today would disagree with this assessment. The 
contemporary relevance of the Keynes-Tinbergen debate to development economics is 
confined to those first generation empirical and field studies that are essentially 
descriptive accounts, yet aspire to have relevance for inferring the validity of some 
(frequently implicit) theory of the development process, predicting the future, or 
recommending suitable policies. Many such studies aim to avoid the latter explicitly, in 
the standard anthropological approach of `description for description’s sake’ ---- yet often 
make implicit inferences and policy judgments from their descriptions. Description is one 
thing, but inference is quite another --- what Keynes referred to as the ` slippery problem 
of passing from statistical description to inductive generalization’. This is exactly the 
purpose of modern econometrics, i.e., explicitly specify the hypothesis to be tested, 
derive their observable implications, use these in inference, and test as far as possible 
assumptions required for the validity of the inference. Such studies are now common at 
the frontier of contemporary empirical research in development economics.  
 
A decade later a similar debate arose between Tjalling Koopmans, and Rutledge 
Vining, following Koopmans’ critical review of an empirical analysis of business cycles 
by Burns and Mitchell.5  Koopmans’ critique provides an eloquent statement of the 
shortcomings of `measurement without theory’, drawing analogies from the relationship 
between the empirical Keplerian stage and theoretical Newtonian stage in celestial 
mechanics. He provides three main arguments.  
                                                 
4 D. Hendry, “Econometrics: Alchemy or Science?” Economica, Vol. 47 (November 1980), 387-406. 
5 This debate originally appeared in the Review of Economics and Statistics between 1947 and 1949. It is 
reprinted in the American Economic Association’s volume of Readings in Business Cycles. 
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“My first argument, then, is that even for the purpose of systematic and 
large scale observation of such a many-sided phenomenon, theoretical 
preconceptions about its nature cannot be dispensed with….(their) 
analysis employs the following seven series…There is no systematic 
discussion of the reasons for selecting these particular variables as most 
worthy of study….The lack of guidance from theoretical considerations is 
perceivable also in the choice of the measures computed from the 
variables selected…The rejection of the help that economic theorizing 
might give leaves a void. For now there is a need for some organizing 
principle to determine on what aspects of the observed variables attention 
should be concentrated…” (p. 190-191) 
 
“The movements of economic variables are studied as if they were the 
eruptions of a mysterious volcano whose boiling cauldron can never be 
penetrated. There is no explicit discussion at all of the problem of 
prediction, its possibilities and limitations, with or without structural 
change, although surely the history of the volcano is important primarily 
as a key to its future activities. There is no discussion whatever as to what 
bearing the methods used, and the provisional results reached, may have 
on questions on economic policy. This, then, is my second argument 
against the empiricist position:  without resort to theory, in the sense 
indicated, conclusions relevant to the guidance of economic policies 
cannot be drawn.” (pp. 196-197) 
 
“…the extraction of more information from the data requires that, in 
addition to the hypotheses subject to test, certain basic economic 
hypotheses are formulated as distributional assumptions, which often are 
not themselves subject to statistical testing from the same data. Of course, 
the validity of information so obtained is logically conditional on the 
validity of the statistically unverifiable aspects of these basic hypotheses. 
The greater wealth, definiteness, rigor, and relevance to specific questions 
of such conditional information, as compared with any information 
extractable without hypotheses of the kind indicated, provides the third 
argument against the purely empirical approach.” (p. 200) 
 
Vining’s response is rich and detailed, which among various other points refers 
back to a classification of different stages of research that originated with Trygve 
Haavelmo: 
 
“Haavelmo gives a rough fourfold classification of the main problems 
encountered in quantitative research: first, the construction of tentative 
theoretical models; second, the testing of theories; third, the problem of 
estimation; and fourth, the problem of prediction. It may be noticed that 
the first problem (possible the second, depending upon one’s 
interpretation) is the only one of the four that is not a problem of strictly 
modern statistical theory. He goes on to say that the “explanation of 
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phenomena” consists of digging down to more fundamental relations are 
those that have a great degree of invariance or autonomy with respect to 
the ordinary or reasonably expected changes in economic structure, and a 
theory is a construction of a system of autonomous relations.” (p. 211) 
 
Vining then goes on to discuss the shortcomings of the prevailing theoretical 
paradigm and therefore argue that business cycle research was still in the first stage: 
 
“Is the Walrasian conception not in fact a pretty skinny fellow of untested 
capacity upon which to load the burden of a general theory accounting for 
events in space and time which take place within the spatial boundary of 
an economic system? When we think of the enormous body of factual 
knowledge digested and systematized in the other fields of variation and 
the meagerness of our own results from efforts to systematize, are we 
quite ready to leave Haavelmo’s first problem and launch into the last 
three problems in estimation theory?....Burns and Mitchell presumably are 
still on Problem 1. Koopmans has vaulted over, some would say hastily if 
the research is in the field of economics, to Problems 3 and 4. This is not 
to deny the very great interest that economic research has in the results of 
Koopmans’ group on Problems 3 and 4. But it is to express belief that, so 
long as a field of knowledge continues to develop, workers will be 
puttering around, and not in vain, within the unexplored expanses of 
Problem 1 --- the searching for regularities and interrelations of 
regularities and the feeling around for interesting theoretical models. Not 
all this work will find formal mathematics of immediate use, and much of 
it will be such an explorative character as to render almost meaningless the 
notion of a planned maximization of information from given data.” (pp. 
212-213) 
 
Vining’s rejoinder is an important reminder of the value of exploratory data 
analysis as a preliminary stage of research on any given economic phenomenon, which 
precedes and aids the formulation of concrete theories of that phenomenon. The large 
masses of data on planetary motion collected by Tycho Brahe were no doubt a useful step 
for Kepler in his effort to organize the observed phenomena into a number of empirical 
laws, which in turn were a precondition for the Newtonian stage. In most areas of 
economics where the relevant theory is far from obvious, the value of similar exploratory 
data analysis in helping the evolution of such theories cannot be understressed.  
 
Accordingly I would modify Haavelmo’s classification to add a pre-theory stage 
prior to his stage 1, and for purposes of brevity merge the second and third stages of 
testing and estimation. The modified classification would then constitute the following: 
Stage 1: empirical description of the relevant phenomenon, consisting of exploratory data 
analysis aimed at helping identify empirical regularities that need to be explained by a 
suitable theory, and in addition the nature of assumptions that  such a theory can make 
without gross violation to the empirical patterns. Stage 2: the formulation of a relevant 
theory, including derivation of potentially observable (hence falsifiable) implications. 
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Stage 3: The testing and estimation of theories, a stage which may lead back to 
modification or replacement of the previous theories, in an iterative back and forth with 
Stage 2. Stage 4: use of the least unsuccessful theory from the standpoint of empirical 
verification for purposes of prediction and policy evaluation.  From the standpoint of this 
classification, we can interpret Koopmans’ critique of empirical work as pertaining to 
Stages 3 and 4, while Vining’s rejoinder can be interpreted as a defense of Burns and 
Mitchell’s work as pertaining to the pre-theory Stage 1. In the next section I shall review 
the ebb and flow of the role of theory and empirical research in the field of development 
economics over the past century in the light of this particular classification. 
 
Looking Back: The Role of Theory in Development Economics in the past 75 years 
 
Barring important isolated contributions in the earlier part of the century such as 
the work of Allyn Young, development economics emerged as a distinct field in the 
1940s and 1950s. The principal protagonists in the early decades combined both Stage 1 
empiricists such as Kuznets and Myrdal, and Stage 2 theorists such as Rosenstein-Rodan, 
Hirschman, Leibenstein, Lewis, Nurkse, Scitovsky and Sen. The field remained quite 
aloof and isolated from mainstream neoclassical economics, as the principal ideas of that 
literature  ---- coordination failures, poverty traps, take-off into self-sustained growth, 
critical minimum effort, pecuniary externalities, balanced and unbalanced growth, 
dualism, surplus labour, institutional failures --- were not quite consistent with the 
Walrasian paradigm. Instead they were based on implicit assumptions of pervasive 
externalities, missing markets, economies of scale, imperfect competition, and imperfect 
information, for which satisfactory theories comparable in logical completeness, detail 
and elegance to the Walrasian theory were then lacking.  The key policy concern was the 
suitable design of strategies of development planning led and regulated by the state. Later 
in the 1960s and 70s the theories followed in a similar tradition, addressing issues such as 
cost-benefit analysis, migration and optimal growth, in the work of Lefeber, Little, 
Mirrlees, Chakravarty, Sen, Dasgupta, Marglin, Harris, Todaro and many others. During 
this stage theoretical research predominated, or gained more visibility, with limited 
interchange between theoretical and empirical researchers. The field was definitely at 
somewhere between Stages 1 and 2. Stage 3 involving detailed testing and estimation of 
the theoretical models had not yet begun.  
 
The next phase involved a shift to a different set of phenomena and theoretical 
framework, which brought development economics closer to the mainstream. Key to this 
were theoretical developments in mainstream economics the 1970s, which began to 
incorporate departures from the Walrasian paradigm systematically, especially with 
respect to theories of imperfect competition and of asymmetric information. On the one 
hand these led to rigorous theories of some of the ideas that the early pioneers had 
discussed in less formal terms, such as coordination failures, endogenous growth theory, 
incomplete markets and efficiency wages. The literature on asymmetric information and 
contract theory began to be applied to agrarian institutions in developing countries, 
motivated by the empirical patterns documented for the latter by Bardhan and Rudra in 
the 1970s. The 1980s saw a large range of theoretical contributions of this kind, a 
broadening of issues including dynamic implications of contractual imperfections, 
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political economy, governance problems, and the role and functioning of social norms. It 
represented the maturation of Stage 2 research in the field. 
 
This enabled Stage 3 to commence. As a backdrop to this it is worth mentioning 
changes to mainstream theory that had also occurred during the 1970s and 80s. It could 
now accommodate a far broader range of phenomena, with the increasing incorporation 
of a game theoretic tool. But this also meant that the Walrasian paradigm, a single 
overarching unified framework that had dominated economics for almost a century or 
more, was giving way to a fragmented collection of disparate models designed to explain 
disparate phenomena. Replacing price theory by noncooperative game theory meant there 
was now scope for great arbitrariness in the formulation of the institutional setting: who 
are the players, what are their strategy sets, who moves when, knows what and so on. 
Added arbitrariness is introduced by a proliferation of equilibrium solution concepts in 
the presence of dynamics and imperfect information. More recently game theorists have 
been exploring yet other variations in terms of limited rationality and alternatives to 
common knowledge assumptions. The result is an embarrassment of riches when it 
comes to choice of a theoretical model for almost any phenomenon.  
 
This paradigm shift has of course occasioned many other methodological debates 
within the profession, most notable of which is the interchange between Carl Shapiro and 
Frank Fisher concerning models of industrial organization.6 Their debate highlights the 
strength and weakness of the `new institutional economics’ grounded in game theory. On 
the one hand one can now more easily formulate theoretical models of a much large 
ranger of phenomena; on the other one can find a profusion of very distinct models for 
the same phenomenon, which are empirically difficult to distinguish. While Fisher 
laments that `there is no theory of oligopoly’, Shapiro hails the ability of the approach to 
capturing the richness of forms of oligopolistic interaction and business strategy, 
analogous to theories of evolutionary biology grounded in general principles (of 
adaptation and survival) that yield disparate range of behavior and strategy in different 
environments.  
 
Shapiro’s view is consistent with the now widely accepted view in development 
economics that `institutions matter’. But for the further progress of research, the 
profusion of theories for any given pheneomenon that are difficult to distinguish 
empirically, is a bewildering problem. What agents care about, what they can do, when 
do they move, do they interact repeatedly, are there important state variables or is the 
interaction represented by a repeated game, how patient they are, what can they contract 
over --- these are all choices which theoretical models today must confront, with very 
little guidance from empirical facts. So while the new theoretical developments provided 
a language to discuss many classic developmental issues, unlike the Walrasian paradign, 
they raised at least as many new questions as they resolved. Attempts to extend the 
Walrasian paradigm to contexts of asymmetric information have similarly run into the 
problem of many competing formulations with diverging implications for inferences 
concerning market failure, and the role of the state. An instance of this is the absence of 
any single competitive theory of moral hazard, with Prescott and Townsend constructing 
                                                 
6 This appeared in the Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 20 no. 1, Spring 1989. 
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one such theory where the classical Arrow Debreu theorems extend, while Stiglitz and his 
various coauthors construct alternative competitive models where they do not.7 These 
competing extensions vary with respect to formulation of commodities that are traded, 
and of the agents in the economy, issues so fundamental that they cannot be empirically 
distinguished.  Nor can they settle on theoretical grounds either, leaving economists with 
trusting their own subjective judgment for the most appropriate formulation in any given 
setting.  
 
Back now to Stage 3 of the progress of the research agenda in development 
economics, which can be said to be well under way over the past decade. The typical 
paper at any leading conference or journal in development economics is now of this 
genre. It will typically focus on an issue or phenomenon on which the authors have 
gathered some empirical data, frame a theoretical hypothesis which can be `taken to the 
data’, followed by econometric estimation and testing. Even theoretical papers are 
pressed to refer more to documented empirical facts for purposes of motivation and 
justification. Increasingly scholars are going to the field to get a feel for ground level 
institutions, in order to decide on the most salient issues to focus on and the kind of 
theoretical formulation that is best suited to the task, then collect their own data, before 
proceeding to the econometric analysis. The theoretical model helps identify the relevant 
variables, ways to measure them, identify potential econometric problems such as 
endogeneity bias, measurement error, selection bias and so on, and then the best ways of 
testing for these biases. The empirical methodology is quite close to those pursued in 
other fields of economics, most notably labour economics. This is pretty much the kind of 
research that Koopmans had in mind while criticizing the Burns and Mitchell statistical 
compendium of business cycles. To my mind this kind of empirical work represents an 
important stage of maturation of the field, an important progression from Stages 1 and 2 
to Stage 3. 
 
The key problems confronted by a typical empirical paper today concern the 
seriousness of the various possible econometric biases. The skill and quality of the paper 
is related to the degree of persuasiveness of the inferences made by the analysis, in terms 
of its vulnerability to inferential errors. Most of these problems can be confronted with 
appropriate econometric tools, but ultimately with the availability of higher quality data 
sets, e.g., with better measured variables, longitudinal panels to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, and availability of suitable `instruments’ for potentially endogenous 
regressors and selection biases. These econometric concerns are important and 
substantive, and lie at the heart of Keynes’ “slippery problem of passing from statistical 
description to inductive generalization”, or going from observed correlations to 
inferences concerning causation.  
 
                                                 
7 Elsewhere I have elaborated further on the relation between these two alternative formulations of 
competitive economies with asymmetric information, e.g., ‘Market Failure and Information’, in Bhaskar 
Dutta (ed.) Welfare Economics, Oxford in India Readings, 1993, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, and 
‘Markets versus State: A Sterile Controversy?’ in Kaushik Basu, Pulin Nayak and Ranjan Ray (Ed.) 
Markets versus Governments, 2003, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 
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Not surprisingly, all this comes at a price. Research papers tend to get evaluated 
almost exclusively in terms of their success in combating the econometric problems, 
often to the exclusion of the importance of the context or issues addressed by the 
analysis, the imaginativeness of the underlying hypotheses formulated or tested, or the 
importance of the findings from a wider standpoint. A well executed paper goes into a 
particular phenomenon in a particular location in considerable depth, data permitting. The 
research is consequently increasingly microscopic in character. We have very little sense 
of the value of what we have learned for any specific location to other locations. If 
suitable data does not exist to address a given topic in an econometrically satisfactory 
manner, then the research project is dropped, even though some aspects of the data would 
be of wider interest. 
 
The concern to minimize econometric bias is increasingly motivating the 
discipline to study randomized experiments, either natural or controlled. In such 
experiments the treatment of the key explanatory variable of interest is randomized by 
design, much like the statistical experiments initiated and applied to the context of 
agriculture crop experiments and more recently, clinical trials of drugs in medicine. This 
is a way of ensuring the observed treatment effects are entirely uncontaminated by any 
kind of bias, either owing to measurement error, exclusion of omitted variables or reverse 
causality. More often than not the exercise concerns the effects of some policy 
intervention on an outcome of intrinsic interest to policy makers. In order to avoid the 
problem of vulnerability to any kind of arbitrariness with respect to theoretical 
formulation of structural relationships, only `reduced form’ relationships connecting the 
treatment variables to outcome variables are estimated. The result is akin to clinical trials 
concerning a particular medical treatment, the effect of which on some dimension of 
health outcomes of patients is sought to be estimated. Once the relevant `experiment’ is 
set up --- i.e., the treatment and outcome variables identified, and the randomized 
selection of treatment and control groups implemented, all that remains to be done is a  
statistical comparison of corresponding averages of the outcome variables across the two 
groups. The purpose is not to understand the underlying structure of the system of 
relationships generating the outcomes, only the statistical outcome impact of certain 
policy treatments. Indeed, the only knowledge of structure required is that involved in 
designing the experiment. To this extent it responds to Koopmans’ first critique, and by 
its very nature also to the second, being concerned directly with policy evaluation, though 
it can be argued (as I will below) that greater use of theory could permit a wider range of 
policy assessments.  
 
Controlled experiments of course can be used for other purposes as well, such as 
in testing  theories, as they are used frequently in the natural sciences. With few 
exceptions, the wave of recent randomized evaluations in development economics are not 
designed to test theories, but proceed directly to the question of policy evaluation that 
constitutes Stage 4 research. In particular, these represent an approach to evaluate 
policies with minimal knowledge or interest in structure. It is in this sense that there is 
little theory at the frontier of development economics today; this seems to be reflected in 
the curricula and training of graduate students at leading universities. Whether it is ‘too 
little’ or ‘enough’ is the question I want to finally address.  
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‘Too Little’ or ‘Enough’ Theory? 
 
Let me now put forward the set of reasons why I feel that it is ‘too little’.  
 
First, there are still many important and interesting theoretical questions still 
waiting to be addressed. These include dynamic implications of factor market 
imperfections for individual agents, for their investment decisions that affect the 
evolution of their families’ future assets and occupations, and how these would be 
affected by external shocks or policy interventions. The interaction of economic 
processes with political institutions and social norms is another important area where 
many interesting theoretical possibilities remain to be explored. The implications of 
replacing traditional assumptions of rationality by behavioural models, and endogenous 
evolution of preferences for many key policy issues in development are just beginning to 
be explored.   
 
Second, even within the context of randomized policy experiments, there is 
considerable scope for enlarging the scope and precision of inferences if they were 
combined with an effort to test for alternative theories of the structure of underlying 
relationships generating observed outcomes.  There are a variety of reasons for this. For 
one, observed outcomes do not tell us what it is that economic agents really care about, 
i.e., the nature of their preferences. From a policy standpoint, eventually, welfare effects 
should be what really matter. How can we ascertain which kinds of interventions that 
members of any given community really care about? Social scientists risk imposing their 
own judgments regarding this matter, given the fact that due to their expense and 
organizational difficulty they have to choose only a few interventions to evaluate. In the 
1970s and 1980s the main issues that development economists used to address in the 
context of rural areas of underdeveloped countries were imperfections in land and credit, 
issues that have since been superceded by the delivery of education and health services in 
contemporary research. There is relatively little attention to the comparative significance 
of investments in rural infrastructure, such as roads, irrigation and marketing 
arrangements, which may well be more fundamental. One accordingly needs a theory 
concerning the objective functions of agents, concerning their own evaluation of 
alternative public interventions, which needs to be tested.   
 
Moreover, by their very nature (similar to many clinical drug trials) the scope of 
randomized experiments are limited to assessment of short-term effects, to ignoring 
possible side effects or general equilibrium responses, and of a narrow range of policy 
interventions. Wider assessments would be possible in the presence of better knowledge 
of the underlying behavioural and structural relationships. For instance, theories about the 
payoffs of agents, or the nature of technology and costs, will permit simulation of the 
effects of an alternative range of policies. One could enlarge the scope of randomized 
experiments to allow testing or calibration of structural models that would enable such 
simulations to be carried out. 
 
Finally, we have now come to expect that institutions matter, and that institutions 
vary greatly across communities, regions and countries. If so, what we learn about the 
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effects of a given policy intervention in a given context may not apply to other contexts 
as well. The problem is obviously far more serious for economics than in clinical drug 
trials, since  heterogeneity in human physiology is undoubtedly far less significant 
compared to economic and social institutions. Theories of institutions that relate them to 
observable community characteristics could help us understand how context specific the 
results of specific experiments are.  
 
I should reiterate that my argument is not that randomized experiments do not 
represent a major step forward in the methodology of economists. Instead, it is that they 
tend to be conducted in a manner to minimize the use or testing of theoretical hypotheses. 
They could be substantially enriched if they were also used as a tool for testing 
theoretical hypotheses, or at least maximizing the information that could be extracted 
from such experiments. In this respect they are still subject to Koopmans’ third critique. I 
would add to this that understanding the structure of economic relationships is an 
objective of innate intrinsic importance in social science, quite apart from their usefulness 
in prediction and policy evaluation.  
 
In summary, I am not quite sure that we have made sufficient progress in Stage 3 
to proceed comfortably to Stage 4. Experimental evaluations represent an exciting new 
innovation in research methodology, but they could be designed to also test theories 
instead of just measuring the impact of specific policy interventions. Besides the prospect 
of greater interaction with empirical and experimental methods, investing in theoretical 
research is desirable for the sake of posing new questions and hypotheses that are bound 
to generate interesting spin-offs for future empirical and policy analyses. So my hope is 
that the field of development economics will pursue a more balanced portfolio of 
research methodologies in the future, with a little more emphasis on theory than is the 
current norm. 
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Theory or Empirics in Development Economics 
 
By 
 
Pranab Bardhan 
 
 
 
Since I agree with Dilip Mookherjee on the substance of his arguments, much of 
what I’ll say is supplementary or annotative. 
 
In the last two decades there has been a rejuvenation of development economics, 
and in this the leadership has been provided by a group of empirical researchers mostly in 
the US. In this period there has been an easier availability of detailed disaggregated, often 
household-level, data (for example, LSMS data of the World Bank for several countries 
and Census data in many countries, apart from the Indian N.S.S., ICRISAT, and NCAER 
data). Large memory capacities in our desk computers and sophisticated statistical 
analysis software have made the handling of gigantic datasets easily manageable, with a 
speed that still amazes some of us who, when we started our own empirical work, had 
small Facit machines to be hand-cranked for calculations (including inverting reasonable-
sized matrices in the most labour-intensive way), and for large jobs had to wait for days 
in the queue in the main large-frame computer for the whole campus. Also the influence 
of Labour Economics, where applied econometrics had advanced in a major way a few 
years earlier, has been substantial in allied fields like development. Much more 
meticulous attention is now paid to finding appropriate identification strategy in our 
econometric analysis of causal explanations in a way that makes some of the earlier 
empirical work in development (including my own) look more cavalier. As empirical 
work has become more respectable in development economics, and sophisticated 
empirical strategies (including that of random evaluation) explore new horizons, whole 
armies of graduate students and young faculty are now excited by the field, and nearly 90 
per cent of the papers presented in Development Seminars in the US (including mine at 
Berkeley) are now mainly, and proudly, empirical.  
 
This is a big change from the days when the brighter students in development 
would not dirty their hands with the (inevitably messy) data, when the intricate theorems 
in optimum growth, general equilibrium, imperfect information, or game theory 
beckoned alluringly. The question that Mookherjee posits suggests that the pendulum 
may now have swung too much in the other direction. As someone who has dabbled both 
in theory and empirical work, my inclination is to agree with him and also point, as 
Mookherjee does, to some of the limitations of the newly fashionable empirical approach, 
without doubting its valuable contributions. I shall, however, qualify this with some 
special remarks on the empirical work on Indian development at the end.  
 
In order to slay the dragons of ‘endogeneity’ and ‘reverse causality’ that threaten 
the validity of inference in many of the empirical exercises researchers are forever in 
search of clever ‘instrumental variables’. Once one hits upon a clever ‘instrument’, then 
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the rest is considered relatively secondary, and you crank out your triumphant causal 
explanation from the two-stage regressions. In this we are often careless about the many 
pitfalls of instrumental variables, fail to examine the larger meaning of the identifying 
assumptions, and jump to conclusions. We forget that an instrumental variable even if it 
has satisfactory statistical properties does not by itself give us an adequate causal 
explanation or a satisfactory testing of a theory.   Let me take the example of an article 
which is probably the most widely cited in the recent literature on how development 
depends on institutional quality: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, AJR (2001). It so 
happens that I am often on the same side as these authors when it comes to underlining 
the importance of institutions in development economics, but I cannot go along with the 
way the profession seems to have lapped up their results as authoritative in quantifying 
the effect of institutions, and over-interpreted their significance. In their search for an 
instrumental variable that exogenously affects institutions but not income directly, they 
imaginatively picked a historical variable, colonial settler mortality, and used it in their 
first-stage regressions, and the predicted institutions then explained inter-country 
differences in per capita income in an econometrically cleaner way than has been the case 
before in this literature. Their presumption is that the mortality rates among early 
European settlers in a colony determined whether the Europeans decided to install 
resource-extractive or –plundering institutions there or to settle and build European 
institutions, like those protecting property rights which help long-run investment and 
development. 
 
Even ignoring the usual questions about the quality and comparability of data that 
afflict such cross-country empirical exercises, the fact that some of the early colonies (say 
in Latin America) were run by Europeans (from Spain and Portugal) at a time when they 
did not have those property rights institutions quite in place even at home, and the fact 
that there are many developing countries which largely avoided colonisation (for 
example, China, Thailand, Mongolia, Ethiopia), this particular exercise has many 
substantive and methodological problems: 
 
(a) Are property rights institutions the only type of institutions that matter for 
development? What about participatory and accountability institutions, or 
institutions of investment co-ordination? Bardhan (2005) quantifies the effect of 
some participatory and accountability institutions in explaining the cross-country 
differences in human development indicators. 
(b)  As Przeworski (2004) points out, the procedure of instrumenting recent 
institutions by referring to some old historical fact is flawed because institutions 
change over time. An instrument for the initial institutions need not be a valid 
instrument for the current ones. If good institutions are more likely to survive in 
more affluent countries, then institutional quality today is still endogenous with 
respect to income. 
(c) Albouy (2004) corrects some flaws in the AJR settler mortality measure and 
shows that when the revised data are used, the AJR analysis suffers from a ‘weak 
instrument’ problem. (In general in some of the recent use of the instrumental 
variable approach it is often ignored that a weak instrument can be worse than no 
instrument). AJR, however, has contested Albouy’s corrections. 
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(d)  The disease environment in the 18th or 19th century may be correlated with that 
today, and the latter affects current incomes directly as well as through its effect 
on institutions.   
          
An econometrically cleaner method of establishing causality is through random 
evaluation, which, borrowing a method from medical experiments, has become 
increasingly popular in development economics, as Mookherjee has noted. This is a very 
promising development and some researchers have made a creative use of this, including 
getting involved with NGO’s in the field, as participant observer/researcher and 
influencing their survey design to generate robust statistical estimates. One of the best 
examples of work in this genre is Miguel and Kremer (2004), on the impact of 
deworming drugs among Kenyan school children; this is one of the cleanest empirical 
assessments of externalities, which development economists always talk about but find 
hard to measure. But I share some of the general doubts expressed by Mookherjee on the 
methodology in general. By nature these experiments are much too microscopic, and 
there is a danger of missing ‘the forest for the trees’. A rush to generalizations from these 
experimental results will be unwarranted, as they ignore macro or political-economy or 
general-equilibrium effects of a programme when they are extended to a larger scale, and 
the whole is usually more than a sum of the parts. How reliable will it be to generalize the 
treatment effects of an NGO or government programme, when it is implemented nation-
wide (as in the case of PROGRESA in Mexico, Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, or Self-
Help Groups in micro-finance in India)?   
 
 And after all there is more to development economics than more precise 
programme evaluation or the impact study of a particular intervention. I can see that the 
latter is particularly important for some administrators and loan givers; I can also see why 
international financial institutions (like the World Bank) can benefit from the results of 
these studies on their many projects, which are currently often crudely evaluated. But the 
task of development economists is beyond writing more effective policy manuals; at least 
some of them should think about larger structural and conceptual issues. Our improved 
identifying strategies and controlled experiments have not made us any wiser in 
deciphering the mechanisms through which certain outcomes are generated (the ‘why’ 
and the ‘how’) and the social dynamics that are involved, and without these our causal 
explanations are weak, for all the precision of our tools or the statistical significance of 
our estimates. In fact we are sometimes so obsessed with the precision of these tools, that 
we dismiss potentially insightful exercises that do not pass the standards of our 
econometric vice squads, and we often let the best be the enemy of the good.    
 
 In fact our preoccupation with accurate quantification often takes us away from 
the more important causes of a phenomenon and we concentrate on variables that are 
better measured but may be socially and economically less significant, reminding one of 
the oft-repeated charge against economists, who look for the missing keys not in the dark 
place where they lost them but where there is more light. We tend to work with a thin 
conceptual menu and a large box of precision instruments. In contrast sociologists and 
anthropologists spend much less time on honing these instruments, and more on a richer 
understanding of the processes, relations and dynamics. 
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 In calling for a more balanced portfolio of research Mookherjee has briefly cited 
some of the directions which theoretical research can fruitfully take. Let me add a few 
more to his list. We don’t know enough about the relationship between factor market 
imperfections and the social norms, and how this relationship evolves with changing 
demographic and technological circumstances; how economic processes and community 
institutions interact; how we can go beyond the existing partial-equilibrium models of 
oligopoly to generate a viable theory of factor prices and income distribution in a 
generally oligopolistic economy; an integrated theory of vertical product differentiation, 
firm heterogeneity, marketing economies of scale and international competition;  the 
nature of transitional dynamics (as opposed to comparative statics) as we move away 
from a traditional low-level equilibrium; how economic processes get moulded when the 
state is weak and distant, the legal system is poorly enforced, and there is an ‘oligopoly’ 
of violence (as opposed to the ‘monopoly of violence’ that Max Weber ascribed to the 
state); and so on.  
 
Also, in the recent theoretical and experimental work in economics on departures 
from self-interested maximising behaviour not enough attention has been paid to special 
behavioural issues that arise in poor countries. For example, the ideas emanating from the 
growing literature on fairness and reciprocity in individual economic behaviour need to 
be integrated with the idea of ‘moral economy’ that historians and sociologists have 
talked about both with respect to European and Asian cases: for example, Rudé (1964 ) 
and Thompson (1963) cite cases of peasant jacqueries  where peasants in their rage 
against high prices sometimes looted the granary of a merchant but then paid him what 
they considered a ‘fair’ price; Scott (1976) has cited cases in colonial Vietnam when 
peasants rebelling against landlords seized the harvest but paid the landlord what they 
considered a ‘fair’ cropshare. The interesting angle from the anthropological literature on 
this is that traditional notions of fairness are often asymmetric: (a) in acts of reciprocity 
or gift-exchanges between two parties payments are not supposed to balance, and (b) 
moral economies often have double standards depending on the domain of the moral 
community (a peasant who is meticulously fair-minded in his transactions with fellow 
members of the community has no scruple in cheating people whom he considers 
outsiders). Our theoretical literature, while beginning to handle normative and weak-
willed or time-inconsistent behaviour, is yet ill-equipped to tackle another type of social 
action which sociologists have pointed attention to: problem-solving interaction with 
others in which our ends and means co-evolve, with ends discovered and transformed in 
the process. 
 
The psychological literature on cognitive dissonance and internalization of severe 
constraints has obvious relevance to the way the poor behave: as Sen (1984) reminds us, 
‘many of the inequities of the world survive by making allies out of the deprived and the 
abused’, and as Appadurai (2004) reminds us, the poor may lack “the aspirational 
resources to contest and alter the conditions of their own poverty”. The constraints they 
internalize are not just the ones they themselves face, but their parents, peers and 
neighbours have faced. There is much to draw here from the sociological literature on 
role models and peer effects and the growing socio-economic literature on 
neighbourhood effects (mostly relating to poverty traps in US inner-city ghettos). This 
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also relates to the role of group pride, group anxiety, and other culturally sanctioned 
collective processes which deeply affect our preferences (particularly in developing 
countries suffused with ethnic, caste, or religious affinities), and are yet largely ignored 
by economists. This has implications for incentives and organizations in labour 
markets—as Akerlof and Kranton (2005) have emphasized, but also for our theories of 
collective action (which are dominated by simplistic free-rider presumptions). It raises a 
larger methodological issue as well. Methodological individualism which undergirds 
most of economics (including the recent attempts to depart from postulates of self-
interested maximisation) may not be an appropriate principle when issues of group 
dignity and autonomy supersede individual-oriented motivations. 
 
Finally, while I may agree that there is too little emphasis on theory compared to 
the newly fashionable, though highly valuable, empirical exercises, this is mostly in 
relation to development economics as practiced in the West.  I have to qualify my 
agreement in relation to development economics as practiced in India, where I believe the 
old Brahminical tradition of high premium on theory still persists. We have a fascination 
for the esoteric intricacies of a theoretical problem, much less for the sweat, toil, and tears 
involved in grubby empirical work. In particular, there is a dearth of careful empirical 
work on many vital issues of the Indian economy. While there is a massive amount of 
largely descriptive empirical work published every year (including in the pages of the 
EPW), a great deal of it would have improved in explanatory power if more attention 
were paid to the identification strategies and selection issues that worry econometricians. 
This also would have stimulated the need for better data collection and for trying out 
experimental methods in the field, involving real farmers, real workers, real 
entrepreneurs. There is a great need for more empirical work in India on the structure and 
practices of enterprises in the vast informal sector (more than 80 per cent of even the non-
agricultural labor force is employed there), on inter-relationships among firms in a given 
industry, patterns of industrial evolution with the use of firm-level data, on how our 
marketing and informal insurance institutions work both in agriculture and outside, work 
place practices, recruitment mechanisms and wage-setting institutions in industry, trade, 
and the service sectors, on patterns of technology diffusion, etc. We have a relative 
abundance of household data on consumption and employment. This has fuelled the 
endless debates on measurement of poverty and inequality over the last four decades. Yet 
to this day we know very little on inter-generational mobility, which is probably the most 
important aspect of inequality in an extremely hierarchical society like ours, and there are 
very few attempts at collecting the requisite longitudinal surveys of families. Compared 
to other countries, we have much less solid empirical work on the necessary restructuring 
of our pension system or the building of a comprehensive health insurance system outside 
the formal sector. Fewer good economists are now working on Indian economic history.  
 
Just to give one example, there is now a theoretically-informed economic-
institutional history of long-distance trade and credit in the Mediterranean and Western 
Europe in the early modern period (for example, the work of Avner Greif). Similar work 
cries out to be done for India, with its rich history of long-distance trade and credit, of 
hundi and hawala, and how the caste panchayats and other multilateral reputation 
mechanisms enforced the rules of conduct.  I could go on and on. 
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August 27, 2005 
The New Empirical Development Economics:  
Remarks on Its Philosophical Foundations 
 
Kaushik Basu1 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
 The methodology of scientific research is largely a matter of intuition and knack. 
As a consequence it is hard to think of formal criteria for evaluating methodology. This 
must be one reason why the philosophy of science has made so little progress compared 
to science. The same is true of economics. The subject has made huge gains. But the 
skirmishes that have been fought about its methodology—for instance, the debate based 
on Friedman’s famous paper (1953)—have done little to enlighten us. Nevertheless, there 
is value in occasionally pulling ourselves back and asking whether the method that we 
use to advance knowledge in a particular discipline is right. Dilip Mookherjee’s masterly 
essay, based on a symposium at Cornell University, does precisely that. It is an exercise 
in introspection and an invitation to practitioners to take stock of the methodology of 
development economics.  
 
 There may be special value in taking up this invitation because development 
economics has witnessed an upsurge in innovative empirical research. The new empirical 
development economics2 is a remarkable achievement. It is not surprising that, once its 
method was properly understood, there was an explosion of research using its techniques 
(by, for instance, Esther Duflo, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Edward Miguel, Simon 
Johnson, Michael Kremer, Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson, Kaivan Munshi, Rohini 
Pande). But I have some critiques to offer of this method, which overlap partly with the 
criticisms put forth by Bardhan (2005) and Mookherjee (2005), and goes beyond to some 
rather philosophical matters. I shall in this essay concentrate on what, in Dilip 
Mookherjee’s paper, is described as Stage 4 research and a little on his late stage-3 
research. 
 
 One reason for the popularity of this new method3 is the precision of its findings 
and because, once a result is discovered by this method, we fully understand what it is 
that has been discovered. Let me consider here one particularly elegant paper written in 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Talia Bar and John Roemer for reading the essay making helpful comments and criticisms 
and to Ted O’Donaghue for a very useful suggestion. 
2 Like some of the most interesting concepts in life (consider ‘expressionist art’ or ‘Victorian manners’) 
‘new empirical development economics’ is easier to identify than to define. I will, broadly, take it to refer 
to the recent research which uses controlled randomizations or carefully selected instrumental variables to 
reveal causal links between economic variables that are of particular interest to developing countries.   
3 I refer to this as the “new method” given its relative newness in development economics. The method 
itself is not new—it has been used for some time in epidemiology, for instance.  
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this mode, namely, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004). One of the results reported in this 
paper is the following:  In West Bengal, having a woman head a panchayat has made a 
difference to what the panchayat does; it leads, for instance, to the better provisioning of 
water in the village. 
 
 In a lot of empirical research, there is the risk that reality may be the reverse of 
what is being claimed. For example, suppose that in areas with poor water-supply, 
women (whose traditional job is to fend for the household’s water supply) are so 
preoccupied with the task of fetching water that they cannot participate in local panchayat 
politics. This could easily create the impression that if women participate in panchayat 
politics then this leads to the better provision of water. In this case the deduction would 
be wrong; the causality runs the other way around. What is remarkable about this new 
empirical development economics is that by using the fact of an exogenous 
randomization or the method of carefully-selected instrumental variable it has found a 
way to get around this problem.  
 
Findings like the above one are extremely valuable; they tell us important things 
about the way the world is. A popular view, often encountered in newspapers, is that, in a 
traditional society like India’s, having a woman head a panchayat is of no real 
consequence because she would invariably do her husband’s bidding or be bull-dozed by 
the male members of the panchayat. The study by Chattopadhyay and Duflo tells us, 
compellingly, that that is not so. The new empirical development economics aspires to 
results of this kind. Where this method applies (and as Mookherjee reminds us, it does 
not apply everywhere) it is an excellent method to use.  
 
If despite this, I have criticisms of the new empirical development economics, it is 
clearly not about the method itself but about what we do with it and how we interpret it. 
And on this there are many popular misconceptions that need to be countered. 
 
Furthermore, it should be stated at the outset that I have some skepticism about all 
human endeavour to acquire knowledge. Hence, the limitations that I point to here apply 
much more widely than my focus of attention in this essay, to wit, development 
economics. I use the new empirical economics as a peg for my argument precisely 
because it constitutes some of the best research going on in the field.   
 
 
2.  Prediction and Policy 
 
 
First, it must be recognized that the new method, at least by its own criterion of 
what constitutes correct inference, does not help us predict the future. Put differently, 
suppose we apply the strictness of criterion that this new method demands of empirical 
work, and then ask what we can predict based on this new method? It is important to 
understand that the answer is “very little”.  
Suppose a researcher, studying the effect of aspirin, administers a very low dose 
of the medicine (150 mgs, say) to a random sample of people found walking in the streets 
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of Delhi and finds that, if a person with a headache takes aspirin, he typically (meaning, 
let us say, in 90% of the cases) benefits from it. Let me call this the “research result” 
(RR). Now suppose you are asked what would have been the effect of giving 150 mgs of 
aspirin to a random selection of people in Delhi who were lying down with a headache? 
Based on the RR could you say that they would have benefited from it? The answer 
clearly is no; you can not say much, since this sample does not belong to the population 
on which the original study was done. 
 
Let us now consider how we may use the RR for forecasting. If we next year give 
the people of Delhi, who are walking around, 150 mgs of aspirin, could we expect that 
those with a headache would benefit from this? Strictly speaking, the answer is no. The 
people of next year’s Delhi are not the population from which the RR was derived. Also 
the state variables may be different. The weather may be warmer; there may be more 
suspended particulate matter in the air, and so on. So to use the RR and to predict the 
future is like doing a study of the effects of administering aspirin to people who are 
walking and then presuming that it will apply to those who are lying. If we are fussy 
about proper randomization for our study and take the view that we should not accept the 
wisdom of samples drawn in a biased manner or from the wrong population, we should 
also take the view that we cannot say anything about the future.  
 
This, in turn, means that we cannot make policy prescriptions, since those are 
always recommendations for the future. 
 
This does not mean that the initial RR is useless. If a person told you that he had 
(at the same time that the aspirin research was being done in Delhi) selected people 
randomly from those walking in Delhi and given them 150 mgs of aspirin, you would 
rightly be able to guess that 90% of those with a headache would have benefited from 
this. The trouble arises with going over from yesterday’s population to tomorrows. 
  
One may try to counter this by arguing that between yesterday and tomorrow 
there is no fundamental difference and so no reason to expect a relation that was true 
yesterday to be not true tomorrow. But the difference between yesterday and tomorrow is 
not just a matter of time. Between yesterday and tomorrow there can be war and 
pestilence; between yesterday and tomorrow can be 9/11, altering the way world politics 
in conducted; between yesterday and tomorrow we can have a warmer globe. 
  
One may respond to this further by saying that wars and pestilence do not make a 
difference to the human physical constitution and so we would expect the aspirin result to 
carry over from yesteryear to the future. This is perfectly reasonable but in making this 
argument we are immediately conceding the role of intuition. We are combining our 
statistical finding with our prior ‘knowledge’ that, for matters of health, knowledge 
acquired from one population can be carried over to another. We may hesitate to do this 
about the role of women in panchayats but feel confident about aspirins. This brings us to 
precisely the point I would endorse: These statistical findings are not useless for 
prediction but they have to be combined with unscientific intuition for them to be 
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considered useful. We cannot reject the unscientific and claim that our method has 
predictive power. 
  
Our intuition or our unscientific judgment comes in gradations. Before aspirin is 
tried on anyone, we may have no faith in aspirin; once we know it has worked on people 
last year we have more faith in it next year. And the faith grows inductively. For that 
matter the fact that it has worked on people walking may make us inclined to believe 
somewhat that it will work on people lying down. But note that there is nothing objective 
about these beliefs. As I will argue later, what we so often take to be features of the world 
are actually propensities of the mind. 
  
Let me move on from the subject of prediction and assume (maybe for reasons of 
intuition just discussed) that time cannot make a difference to the subject matter that is 
being researched. So a relation found to be valid today will be valid tomorrow—this is an 
axiom. In that case we can of course predict the future but there remains another fallacy 
that we can fall into if we are not careful in interpreting the results of the new empirical 
development economics. 
 
Notice that, if we draw a person at random from among the Japanese who happen 
to be walking in Delhi4, can we then use the above research result and say that he will 
benefit (meaning with 90% probability) from 150 mgs of aspirin in case he has a 
headache? The answer is no, because this person was not drawn at random from the same 
population as the original research. He was drawn from the Japanese walkers in Delhi, 
which is different from the walkers in Delhi. 
 
The stark case where this would be so is if 10% of Delhi’s walking population 
was Japanese, and it was the case that 150 mgs of aspirin helped a walking person if and 
only if he or she was not Japanese. In this case the RR would be true and, at the same 
time, a randomly-chosen Japanese person would not benefit from aspirin.  
  
This in turn leads us to the following troublesome question. Suppose you know of 
the RR (and this is guaranteed to hold over time). Now you are walking down Janpath in 
New Delhi with a headache, and wondering if you will benefit from 150 mgs of aspirin. 
The answer depends on whether you can be thought of as a random draw of a person 
from the walking population of Delhi. It seems reasonable to me to treat the answer to be 
no. For one, you could be a Japanese in which case you are drawn from the population of 
Japanese walkers in Delhi. Hence, you cannot draw any policy lesson for yourself from 
the research result. This is a rather worrying predicament. It means that whenever I want 
to use a research finding (based on proper controlled experiments) for my own treatment, 
strictly speaking, there is little reason for me to have faith in the result, since I am not a 
random draw from the population. 
  
Am I using too demanding a criterion for what constitutes knowledge? Maybe, 
but since this new method in development economics is itself based on a very strict 
                                                 
4 For those planning to travel to Delhi, I should clarify that this gives a somewhat exaggerated impression 
of Delhi’s cosmopolitanism. 
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criterion of what is statistically correct, therefore those who view this kind of correctness 
as essential should go along with my skepticism. 
 
 
3.  Knowledge and Evolution 
 
 
 The skepticism about the acquisition of knowledge expressed in the above section 
is troublesome. Despite my own inclination towards skepticism, I am aware that one must 
not have an unbending adherence to it (that would be a contradiction anyway for a 
skeptic). One possible mistake that both the skeptic and the practitioner of the new 
development economics have to guard against is that of denying that there may be other 
modes of acquiring knowledge. 
 
To understand this, consider the number of things that we learn from poorly- 
controlled experiments or, for that matter, no experiments. A growing child learns soon 
enough that a frown implies displeasure and a smile implies approval that a slap hurts and 
a massage soothes (especially neck massage), that when a person cries she is sad and 
when she laughs she is happy.  
 
Suppose this child’s father stops the child each time she makes an inference, by 
asking whether she was sure that she was making the deduction from a proper random 
sample and not merely from her experience with those she happens to bump into in her 
everyday life. And suppose he asks her to discard any knowledge not picked up from 
properly randomized experiments. Surely this child will turn out to be a very ill-informed 
adult. The fact of the matter is that the knowledge that we human beings carry in our 
heads is disproportionately from wrongly conducted experiments and from biased 
samples. The knowledge that we have from scientifically-conducted studies—things like, 
80 mgs of aspirin a day can cut the risk of a heart attack by half and oatmeal reduces 
cholesterol—are a tiny fraction of what we know. 
  
This is indeed a puzzle: How do we know so much given the atrociously-biased 
methods we use through life to collect information? Of course, we make errors. My son, 
whose first experience of the world outside of India was Belgium, for a long time after 
our return used to point to any White person he saw in Delhi and say confidently, 
“Belgian.” It took considerable effort on my part to persuade him of the sampling bias 
that underlay his deduction. 
  
There are three responses we can have to this puzzle. One is to try to show how, 
even if each person uses a biased sample, by the act of pooling our individual 
information, as we human beings do, the biases tend to cancel out and for the large part 
correct itself. This would be an interesting research agenda in probability and information 
theory (even though it would still leave open the question of how we can predict about 
tomorrow from our information of yesterday). 
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 But if this theoretical exercise turns out to be futile (and till such a result is proved 
it seems reasonable to proceed as if it were not true), then there are two possible positions 
that we can take. One is to claim that we human beings actually do not know much. 
Much of our knowledge is chimera—a mere illusion of knowledge. Many religious 
traditions and also some irreligious philosophers take such a view. There is a long Greek 
tradition of this5. Historically, the most famous is the philosopher, Pyrrho (4th century 
BC). Pyrrho did not write down any of his philosophy because he was skeptical about its 
value (though, of course, he could have been equally skeptical about the value of not 
writing and written a lot, like Bertrand Russell, also a skeptic6, did). It is believed that he 
went with Alexander’s army to India and returned humbled because in India he had met 
sadhus who not only did not write but did not even speak. Legend has it that he heard one 
of his teachers asking for help, having fallen into a ditch; but he walked away calmly 
because he could not be sure that the teacher would be better off outside the ditch than in 
it. The teacher in this case happened to be Anaxarchus, a philosopher who held many 
similar views to those of Pyrrho. After he was heaved out of the ditch by some others and 
safe, it is believed that his greatest praise was for Pyrrho whom he had seen walk past 
with complete sang-froid (Diogenes Laertius, 1925).  
 
Maybe it was to counter these extreme versions that the later Greek philosopher, 
Carneades (2nd Century BC), stressed that, behaviorally, a skeptic need not be any 
different from a non-skeptic.7 It may however be recalled that Carneades himself caused 
some comical problems by arguing one day in favor of justice and another day against it, 
since he felt committed to neither view. In fact, the Greek physician and philosopher, 
Sextus Empiricus (2nd century AD), took the view that the main consequence of 
skepticism was the tranquility of mind achieved from resigning oneself to the futility of 
the quest for knowledge.  
  
A second position, which is not incompatible with the above one, is to take an 
evolutionary view of knowledge (Basu, 2000). This is to admit that we do not know how 
we know things but, if it is the case that a person’s knowledge or (at a more meta level) 
the facility for acquiring knowledge is inheritable, then the people who have wrong 
beliefs or knowledge about the way the world works (those, for instance, who think that 
the frown on the face of the person approaching them menacingly, knife in hand, 
indicates friendliness) would perish in the long run. So the people we see around know 
that an apple released in the air will fall downwards and know that the knife being 
brought down on a person will kill him. The fact of these people being around means that 
they and their ancestors have survived the weeding process of evolution. The ones who 
knew the wrong things or did not have the facility for learning correctly from nature are 
just not around anymore. By this theory, there is no right way to acquire knowledge. 
                                                 
5 An interesting summary account occurs in Long (1998). 
6 Russell was however troubled by the fact that conventional skepticism was not just a philosophy of doubt, 
but what it never should have been—“dogmatic doubt”. 
7 “We Skeptics follow in practice the way of the world, but without holding any opinion about it.” (Bevan, 
1950, p.52). This, interestingly, amounts to a critique of behaviorism. But I take behaviorism to be an easy 
target, summed up (no doubt in somewhat of a caricature) in the observation, allegedly made by Bertrand 
Russell, that there is no way to tell the difference between a mathematician asleep and a mathematician at 
work.     
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Nature is too idiosyncratic for that. But some minds are synchronized with our 
idiosyncratic nature and some minds are not. The people we see around us, by virtue of 
the fact that they exist, have minds that are in synchrony with nature. 
  
My own belief about the puzzle of knowledge lies somewhere between the 
skeptical and the evolutionary claims. The trouble with this is that unlike others, who 
have strong views on what is the right method, I do not have any. I therefore find it 
difficult to take a clear position on debates like whether we need more theory or more 
empirics. I have some faith in our intuition. Two correctly done empirical results may 
have the property that one resonates with our intuition—we simply feel that if it was true 
in the past it has a reasonable chance of being true in the future—and the other does not.  
My inclination would be to go along with the intuition (while admitting that intuitions 
often go haywire). And the same is true with theoretically-derived results. Some feel 
right; some do not. I would be tempted to give in to the feeling. Hence, the issue is not 
between theory and empirics8. We need to do both as correctly as we can and then use 
our intuition to select the ones we want to live by and base our policy recommendations 
on those and, most importantly, keep our fingers crossed behind our backs, when doing 
so. 
 
 
4.  A Comment on Causality 
 
 
 Economists have a propensity to find the lack of evidence of causality in other 
people’s research. We complain about how other people’s empirical papers demonstrate 
correlation but not causality. Such language is fine, as long as we realize that there is no 
real way for demonstrating causality. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that there is 
anything objective in nature called causality.  
 
It may sound baffling at first sight but it is much more robust to maintain that 
causality lies in the eyes of the beholder. That is, we human beings have it hardwired in 
us to think in terms of causality. This can be a useful feature of our mind. It allows us to 
be more sure-footed than we would be if we could not live as if causality existed9. And, 
as we saw in the last section, there is reason to believe that what our mind takes to be 
causal is reasonably dependable because it has come to be reasonably well synchronized 
with the way nature actually works, thanks to thousands of years of human evolution. 
Hence, it is useful for us to feel that a particular relation is causal (and hence dependable 
                                                 
8 The limitations that I discuss in this paper for empiricism should not be read as endorsement of theory as 
the instrument of choice for understanding the way the economy works. Theory can help us sort certain 
deductive complications but may not be able to do much more (see Appendix to Basu, 2000).  For an 
excellent and persuasive essay on skepticism in the context of theory, see Rubinstein (2004).  
9 The fact that human beings tend to pick up patterns beyond what is actually there has been documented in 
psychological experiments (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). They report on several interesting findings. 
For instance, when people are asked to guess what a random sequence of coin tosses will yield, they 
produce sequences in which heads are closer to 50% than turns out to be the case in reality. This is 
especially true for short sequences. It could however be argued that this tendency on the part of human 
beings may have evolutionary survival value.  
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in the future) and not merely a matter of correlation. But even on this we can make large 
mistakes. I will end on this cautionary note by constructing an example of how we can be 
led astray in our interpretation of probabilities10. 
 
Suppose that there was a ritual in the world whereby in each city the mayor tosses 
a coin 20 times at the start of each millennium. So the last time this was done was on 
January 1, 2000. Let us suppose in Washington a researcher wanted to see if there was 
reason to believe that there was a particular bias in coin tosses in Washington and he 
discovered that in fact all the 20 tosses had yielded heads. He would be tempted to 
publish a paper entitled, “Heads Bias in Washington,” and may have speculated if having 
too many senators or too many lobbyists caused this. In case he had no experience of the 
rest of the world but had experience of coin tosses by others in Washington, he may have 
thought he had made the discovery of how the city’s mayor is head prone. It is indeed 
very surprising to get 20 heads in a row. It does seem to say something to us. 
 
Now return to the problem and think of the larger picture. Given that this ritual is 
followed in thousands and thousands of cities, the probability is very high that a sequence 
of 20 heads will occur somewhere. So the fact that this has occurred somewhere is of no 
interest whatsoever. It reveals nothing beyond what we already knew from our 
rudimentary knowledge of probabilities.  
 
Let me digress for a moment to deal with a possible technical objection.  A critic 
may say that before publishing the paper the author should have collected more 
information so as to decide if what happened was just pure chance. He may for instance 
collect data on another 20 tosses of the coin in Washington. But surely that will not 
change anything because we can pretend that this has already been done. It could, for 
instance, be that he had first collected information on the mayor’s first 10 tosses and, 
seeing that all were heads, asked the mayoral office to send him the data on the next 10 
tosses. He was then astounded to find that the next 10 were also heads and therefore 
wrote the paper. Therefore, we can think of larger and larger number of tosses. As long as 
there are more and more cities where the experiment can be done, we can construct the 
same, logically-equivalent story.  
 
To return to the example, what we have are two propositions. The Washington 
researcher’s feeling that he is onto something interesting seems justified. The outcome 
that he has seen has too small a probability if the probability of each coin toss by the 
mayor of Washington landing a head is half. So he is right in concluding that the 
probability of a head is much more than half. On the other hand, we also know from our 
larger global perspective that there is actually no special information in what happened in 
Washington. A string of successive heads occurring somewhere is very high, even if each 
coin toss has a probability half of getting a head.  
                                                 
10 The philosophical foundations of probability have a history of confounding not just philosophers and 
statisticians but also economists, most famously John Maynard Keynes. Indeed, it may be Keynes’s early 
encounter with probability theory that led to some of his strong views on the empirical method that 
Mookherjee discusses in his paper. 
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The analogue of this problem is that researchers the world over are studying 
different phenomena. They publish only what seems unexpected. Since the expected does 
not get published, we never get the larger global picture (like the data on coin tosses from 
across the world) and so think we have stumbled upon knowledge when, in fact, we have 
not.   
 Am I making a mistake somewhere?
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I.  New Development Economics? 
 
If we take the list of papers cited by BBM (Professors Bardhan, Basu and 
Mookherjee, all in this issue) as representative of what they call “New Development 
Economics”, what is striking is how old-fashioned it all sounds.  The topics, for the most 
part, are the familiar ones: education, health, credit, technology, land, migration.  Even 
institutions, which sound a bit more novel, were being discussed and debated by North 
and his colleagues more than twenty years ago.  It is true that agriculture is a bit less in 
fashion now than it was twenty-five years ago, and there is, to my taste, a bit too much 
about human capital, but relative to many other fields (think of macroeconomics) the 
picture is one of remarkable stability.   
 
In terms of empirical methodology, while there is heightened emphasis on 
running well-identified regressions, the basic concern with distinguishing causation from 
mere correlation, that it reflects, obviously goes back a long way.  The seemingly 
unending debate among development economists of the 1960s and 70s about whether 
bigger farms were less productive (the so-called size-productivity debate), was ultimately 
a debate about causation---about whether it was really size that was doing the damage or 
something associated with size.  What has changed since then is that development 
economists have now embraced all the strategies that have been developed in the last two 
decades, mostly by labor economists, for dealing with identification issues---difference-
in-difference, regression discontinuity designs, randomized experiments, etc---and have 
access to the kind of data that is needed to make of use these techniques.   
 
In other words, these papers reflect, more than anything else, the mainstreaming 
of empirical work in development economics.  The field, as Professor Mookherjee 
explicitly recognizes, has matured.   
 
 
31  
II.  In Defense of Empirical Method 
 
 
BBM share a feeling that in the process of maturing things have gone a bit awry.  
Their main complaint, though none of them quite puts it this way, is that empirical 
standards are now unrealistically high, with the consequence that the top journals are now 
filled with well-identified but uninteresting papers.   
 
To some extent this has to be right.  To accept something that obviously does not 
meet the standards of the profession because the subject is interesting, editors have to 
exercise judgment, and exercising judgment is never easy, especially once you recognize 
that this will expose you to the charge of favoring certain people and/or ideas.  There are 
certainly interesting papers that shed important light onto questions we know little about 
that do not get published because they do not quite make it on some methodological 
imperative. 
 
Would I therefore rather that we had not come to a point where development 
economists are at the cutting edge of empirical techniques?  Absolutely not!  I think the 
fact that there is no special pleading for empirical work using developing country data is 
the reason why so many of the brightest and the best among economics graduate students 
are coming into the field now.  When I was a graduate student, everyone always said that 
development economics was very important but no one actually did it: The problem was 
that if you were a top student you wanted to be where people appreciate your mastery of 
everything that was clever and new (I, for example, did theory, which was very much in 
fashion then).  Now it is development economics that is in fashion. 
 
As far as I am concerned this alone is enough compensation for the sacrifices that 
we have to make to the harsh god of identification.  But I am also convinced that the 
danger of unwarranted rejections is nowhere as serious as the danger of publishing 
spurious results.  As I have argued elsewhere, there is no dearth of ideas in the world of 
development practitioners today.  What is missing is discrimination: There is no rigorous 
process by which bad ideas get dropped and good ideas are identified and made better.   
 
A World Bank publication from few years ago1 provides an excellent example of 
the attitude towards evidence in the development community outside academia.  The 
Sourcebook is meant to be a catalogue of what, according to the Bank, are the right 
strategies for poverty reduction.  These are also, we presume, strategies into which the 
Bank is prepared to put its money.  It provides a very long list of recommended projects, 
which include: computer kiosks in villages; cell phones for rent in rural areas; 
scholarships targeted toward girls who go to secondary school; schooling voucher 
programs for poor children; joint forest management programs; water users groups; 
citizen report cards for public services; participatory poverty assessments; internet access 
for tiny firms; land titling; legal reform; micro-credit based on group lending; and many, 
many, others.   
                                                 
1 Narayan, Deepa.  Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook.  Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
2002. 
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While many of these are surely good ideas, the book does not tell us 
how we know that they work.  Indeed, one memorable example 
makes clear that this is not a primary concern of the authors.  The 
book describes a program called the Gyandoot program which is 
based in Madhya Pradesh in India and provides computer kiosks in 
rural areas.  The Sourcebook acknowledges that this project was hit 
hard by lack of electricity and poor connectivity and that “Currently 
only a few of the Kiosks have proved to be commercially viable”.  It 
then goes on to say, entirely without irony, “Following the success of 
the initiative….” (p. 80). 
 
The most useful thing a development economist can do in this environment is to 
stand up for hard evidence and to be demanding about the kind of empirical work that 
gets into the better journals.  Regressions published in the top places have a way of 
filtering into policy conversations---the power of statistics combined with the imprimatur 
of a top journal can be irresistible.  A recent example is the work by Burnside and Dollar 
on the impact of aid on growth: In a paper published in the American Economic Review 
(2000),2 they showed results suggesting that aid does help growth but only when it is 
given to countries that pursue the “right” policies.  This is, of course, also the idea behind 
President Bush’s Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), and while I do not have any 
direct evidence of a causal connection between the two, the Burnside-Dollar work is 
frequently cited as a part of case for the MCA (including by the United States Congress 
Research Services).  Yet there are multiple reasons why we (and especially the editors of 
the AER) should have been more skeptical of the Burnside and Dollar results.  First, 
because policies are not exogenous: They reflect other things that are right about the 
country.  Second, aid is not exogenous either—countries with bad policies that received a 
lot of aid may have other problems (for example, dictatorships that are aligned with the 
U.S. tended to get a lot of aid in the old days), which makes it hard to compare them with 
other countries.  In any case, a later paper by Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003) 
showed that the result in the Burnside and Dollar paper disappears when they update the 
data.3  But the MCA is here to stay.4  
 
But how do we know that well-identified regressions are any better?  For one, as 
Professor Basu points out, there is the very real risk of reporting bias: To get published it 
helps to have the kind of results that the editors or referees want.  Professor Basu is 
worried that this favors papers with unexpected results, but it could also favor results of a 
particular political bent.   
 
                                                 
2 Burnside, Craig and Dollar, David. “Aid, Policies, and Growth.” American Economic 
Review, September 2000, 90(4), pp. 847–68. 
3 William Easterly, Ross Levine and David Roodman, “New Data, New Doubts: A Comment on 
Burnside and Dollar’s “Aids, Policies and Growth(2000).”, mimeo Department of Economics, New York 
University 
4 Indeed, given all the identification problems with running this regression, there is no reason to presume 
that either result is actually correct.  In other words, the real problem is that we have not learnt anything 
from the evidence.  It therefore remains entirely possible that the MCA will end up doing much good in the 
world.   
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Note, however, that this is potentially just as true of ill-identified regressions as it 
is of well-identified ones.  Indeed, the fact that papers these days are getting published 
because they have a clever identification strategy, something that Professors Mookherjee 
and Bardhan deplore, has the advantage of reducing the emphasis on results.  The main 
contribution of a number of the papers that BBM cite as examples of new development 
economics (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001);5 Munshi (2003);6 etc.) was to 
provide credible evidence for what many others before them have claimed (“institutions 
matter”, “social networks are important”, etc.).   
 
That being said, I think there is a widely shared feeling that we need to do more 
about this problem.  In particular, I support an initiative to set up a website where every 
randomized evaluation has to be registered before it gets launched.  At the time of 
registration, the principals of the study will be required to list the outcomes of interest 
and their predictions regarding each of them (just the direction, not the magnitudes), as 
well as a reasonable study completion date.  They will then be required to report 
whatever results they have, on or before the announced date.  This would guarantee that 
all studies (including the ones that fail and the ones that have boring results) get recorded, 
that the authors cannot decide ex post to emphasize interesting outcomes that they never 
thought of when they started the work, and that the experiment does not continue until it 
yields the desired result.  Doing something like this for non-experimental work would be 
harder: While experiments tend to be very visible, there is no way to know all the failed 
regressions that get run---unless the authors want to report them.  One thing that might 
help is to set up a web-space where people can report their failed regressions (just a 
paragraph . . . we ran this regression in this data set and found the wrong answer or no 
answer), and then editors can require all future published authors on the same subject to 
cite these failed studies.  In the end, however, this remains another point in favor of 
randomized experiments over more traditional empirical exercises.   
 
On the other hand, it is true, as Professor Bardhan points out, that randomized 
evaluations typically give us only the short-term impact of a particular intervention.  
However, the main reason for this is that the authors of the study want to be able to report 
some results without having to wait forever, though in many there is nothing, in principle, 
to stop them from continuing to follow the treatment and control groups after the first 
round results have been reported.  For example, consider Miguel-Kremer’s work on de-
worming cited by Professor Basu.7  In that study, they randomly assigned a program of 
giving free de-worming medicine to children across a set of schools in Busia District in 
Western Kenya and found that the children in the schools where the medicine was given 
came to school much more regularly.  While that paper is published, the study continues: 
The goal is to discover whether the fact that they came to school more often helps these 
children in their future life.  To do so they will need to follow the children in both the 
                                                 
5 D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An 
Empirical Investigation”, American Economic Review, 91(5), 2001. 
6 Munshi, K. (2003), ‘Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U.S. Labor Markets,’ 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118. 
7 Miguel, E. and M. Kremer (2004), “Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence 
of Treatment Externalities,’ Econometrica, Vol. 72 (1): 159-218. 
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treatment and control groups as they grow older.  This is possible because even though 
the control schools may now be treated, the children who graduated from those schools 
before the medicine was introduced there continue to be a valid control group for the 
corresponding cohorts in the treatment schools.   
 
The point is that there is no necessary conflict between the goals of extending the 
treatment to the control group (assuming it works) and studying the long-term impact of 
the treatment.  There are cases where this will not work---these are programs where 
literally every group will end up treated once the program is expanded---but these are 
more the exception than the rule.  The bigger constraint, it seems to me, is the sheer effort 
that goes into following people into the future, but if the stakes are high enough, it will be 
done. 
 
Among the various concerns raised by BBM, the two most important are what I 
would call the problem of scope and the problem of size.  The problem of scope comes 
from the fact, emphasized by Professors Bardhan and Mookherjee, that most well-
identified empirical exercises tend to be relatively localized: This is what makes it 
possible to rule out other conflating factors (the extreme case of this is a randomized 
experiment where we deliberately restrict the domain in order to have full control over 
the program placement).  This, they suggest, compromises the external validity of these 
results—how can we draw general lessons from something so limited? 
 
Professor Basu takes this argument a step further.  The external validity of a piece 
of empirical research, however carefully done he argues, cannot be entirely derived from 
something internal to that work.  To apply these results, we need to have a theory that 
helps us decide whether a particular location (in space, or Professor Basu emphasizes, in 
time) is sufficiently similar to the location from where the results came.  And in most 
cases this theory would not come close to meeting the standards of evidence that 
development economics today aspires to, and even if it did, the problem of external 
validity would remain, just shifted back a layer.   
 
This is obviously correct.  Indeed it seems to me to be a version of David Hume’s 
justly famous demonstration of the lack of a rational basis for induction.  But at this point 
Professor Basu makes a curious leap into what reads like radical skepticism.  As he puts 
it, “Two correctly done empirical results may have the property that one resonates with 
our intuition—we simply feel that if it was true in the past it has a reasonable chance of 
being true in the future—and the other does not.  My inclination would be to go along 
with the intuition (while admitting that intuitions often go haywire).”  This seems to 
imply (by continuity) that if one empirical conclusion accorded less well with his 
intuition than another, but was somewhat more “correctly done”, would he still go with 
the latter?  In other words, he denies the primacy of empirical methods over his intuition.   
 
I must confess that I do not understand this position.  To take an example, one of 
the early randomized experiments in Busia District of Kenya looked at the effect of 
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having flip charts in the classroom on the performance of children.8  It found that the 
children in the schools that were randomly chosen to get a flipchart do not do any better.  
The study then looks at what it would have found if it had tried to answer the same 
question based on running a retrospective cross-section regression using data from other 
schools in the same part of Kenya.  In other words, they ran a simple regression of the 
test scores on whether the school had flip-charts in this other sample of schools.  They 
found that having flip-chart raises student performance about 0.2 standard deviations.   
 
My inclination, faced with this evidence, is to assume that the experiment gave 
more or less the right answer for what would happen in an average school.  I start from 
the fact that the experiment was correctly done: The experimental result is therefore the 
right conclusion for those particular schools.  The question then is whether this also the 
correct result for other schools of this type in the area, including the ones in the 
retrospective study.  To believe this, I would need to believe: (a) that the cross-section 
study is biased; and, (b) that the treatment effect does not vary across the two 
populations.   
 
Say that Professor Basu, on the other hand, believes that the retrospective result is 
the correct generalizeable prediction because it fits better with his prior intuition (this is 
entirely hypothetical and almost surely unfair to him, but it helps to set out the structure 
of our disagreement).  He therefore believes that: (a) the retrospective result is unbiased; 
and, (b) that the treatment effect is not the same in these two populations.   
 
These two sets of beliefs (his and mine) are, however, not symmetrical.  The fact 
that the treatment effect varies in this way is not something that he has any independent 
reason to believe: The study which (I assume) summarizes everything either of us knows 
about the area, suggests that the populations are in fact quite similar.  Or to put it 
differently, the only reason to suppose that the treatment effect is higher in one of these 
populations than the other is that this is what squares with his prior---this was not 
something that he learnt from the data generated by the retrospective study or any other 
study.   
 
My suspicion of the results from the retrospective study, on the other hand, stems 
from the standard observation, confirmed by any number of studies, that schools in 
developing countries that have more school inputs tend to be schools where parents are 
richer and/or care more about education and hence are schools where the children would 
have done better even without the extra inputs.  I worry that the fact that children in 
schools with flipcharts do better than children in schools without flipcharts could be 
partly a result of this.  In other words, I favor the experimental result mainly because I 
have an independent reason to suspect that the retrospective result is biased upwards.   
 
Moreover, my assumption that the treatment effect is the same in the two 
populations, while not justified by any direct evidence, would seem to be the natural 
                                                 
8 Glewwe, Paul, Michael Kremer, Sylvie Moulin and Eric Zitzewitz (2004), “Retrospective vs. Prospective 
Analyses of School Inputs: The Case of Flip Charts in Kenya,” Journal of Development Economics, 74: 
251-268. 
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default assumption in the absence of any information to the contrary.  It is clearly the way 
we are designed to function in the world---when we meet a new child our first instinct is 
to treat him like all the other children we know---though I would not know whether it is 
evolution that has made us so (as Professor Basu would have it), or our own experience 
with what is sometimes called the “uniformity of nature”. 
 
None of this, however, tells us exactly what to do when we expect there to be 
systematic differences between the two populations.  If our only really reliable evidence 
was from India but we were interested in what might happen in Kenya, it probably does 
make sense to look at the available (low quality) evidence from East Africa.  Moreover, if 
the two types of evidence disagree, we might even decide to put a substantial amount of 
weight on the less reliable evidence, if it turns out that it fits better with our prior beliefs.  
Nevertheless, there remains an essential asymmetry between the two: The well-identified 
regression does give us the “correct” estimate for at least one population, while the other 
may not be right for anyone.  For this reason, even if we have many low quality 
regressions that say the same thing, there is no sense in which the high quality evidence 
becomes irrelevant---after all, the same source of bias could be afflicting all the low 
quality results.  The evidence remains anchored by that one high quality result.   
 
That being said, the only way to build trust in experimental and quasi-
experimental results is to replicate them in several different locations.  One of the 
strengths of the Miguel-Kremer work on de-worming cited by Professor Basu,9 is that it 
has now been reproduced in India (the original study was in Kenya) with very similar 
results.10  Moreover, Bleakley (2004),11 using quasi-experimental methods to estimate the 
effect of de-worming in the U.S. South also finds a structural estimate very similar to 
what these two other studies find.  The randomized evaluation of the Balsakhi remedial 
education program in India was carried out simultaneously in two different locations 
(Mumbai and Vadodara) by two different implementing teams for exactly this reason, 
and, reassuringly, found more or less the same results in two locations.12 These results 
suggest that extrapolating these results across large distances may not always be as bad as 
it might seem, but clearly many more replications need to happen.   
 
The problem of size arises because randomized experiments in particular tend to 
be relatively small-scale, partly due to practical and financial constraints, but also in part 
because we want the experimental results before scaling up the program.  Other careful 
micro studies are less constrained, but the need to know exactly what is going on, which 
underlies good identification strategies, tends to limit the scope of these studies as well.  
Size is important for two reasons: One, which applies only to randomized evaluations, is 
that small programs are easy to monitor carefully and therefore are not run like real 
                                                 
9 Miguel, E.  and Kremer, M.  (2004), “Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the 
Presence of Treatment Externalities,’ Econometrica, Vol. 72 (1): 159-218. 
10  Bobonis, Gustavo, Edward Miguel and Charu Puri Sharma (2004), “Iron Deficiency Anemia and School 
Participation”, mimeo, University of California, Berkeley. 
11 Bleakley, Hoyt (2004), “Disease and Development: Evidence from Hookworm Eradication in the 
American South,” mimeo, University of California, San Diego. 
12 Banerjee, Abhijit, Shawn Cole, Esther Duflo and Leigh Linden (2004), “Remedying Education: Evidence 
from Two Randomized Experiments in India”, mimeo, MIT. 
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programs.  While this is a concern, many of the more recent randomized evaluations are 
only small relative to nation-wide programs: The Balsakhi and de-worming studies 
mentioned above, for example, each involved collecting data from tens of thousands of 
children and a number of other recent studies are even bigger.  Moreover there is a lot of 
emphasis on making sure that the programs that get evaluated are developed enough to be 
modular, in the sense that what gets implemented at every location is described by a 
simple and common protocol.  This makes it easier to limit the involvement of the 
program’s sponsors and the evaluators in the implementation process.   
 
Size is also an issue because of what are often misleadingly, called general 
equilibrium effects: Educating some more children in Vadodara or Mumbai is not the 
same as raising educational standards in the country as a whole---presumably if the 
number of educated people in the country goes up enough all sorts of other things will 
change.  Wages paid to educated people will fall; the political clout of educated people 
will rise; other might see them and also start demanding more education; etc.   
 
This is a very real problem, though obviously the import we need to give it 
depends on the question we are asking.  If we are interested in how to get children to 
come to school, we might be okay in ignoring the effect of increased enrolment on wages 
fifteen years hence, since parents probably do not think that far ahead.  On the other 
hand, if we want to figure out how much we add to the future earnings of these children 
by making them go to school, it would be silly to not worry about what would happen to 
wages.  Even the most committed experimentalist would want to do something. 
 
 
III.  The Challenge to Theory 
 
 
This is where, Professor Mookherjee argues, we ought to be using more theory.  
Theory helps because what we really need is to make an assumption, and theory tells us 
what the right assumption would be.  For example, we know from market equilibrium 
theory that the one number we need in order to assess the effect of the increase in 
education on wages is the elasticity of demand for skilled labor.  Armed with this 
knowledge, we could go looking for an estimate of the elasticity and having found one 
(hopefully from an experiment or a quasi-experiment), could use it to calculate the true 
benefits from getting children into school. 
 
Theory can also help us in solving the problem of scope. The conventional 
structural approach, which Professor Mookherjee supports, involves fitting a model with 
a small number of unobserved parameters to the observed program effects, and then using 
this model to make out-of-sample predictions.13 Conceptually, given that parameters of 
the structural model are estimated using the fact that the program effect is different for 
                                                 
13 For an example of using a structural approach to analyze data from a randomized experiment, see: 
Attanasio, Orazio, Costas Meghir and Ana Santiago (2003), “Education Choices in Mexico: Using a 
Structural Model and a Randomized Experiment to Evaluate PROGRESA”, mimeo, The Institute for Fiscal 
Studies. 
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people with different observables characteristics, this is not that different from a naïve 
approach, where we allow the program effect to depend on observables, and then 
extrapolate the results using what we know about the same observables in the new 
population.  The advantage of the structural approach is that we have a theory to guide us 
about the kind of parametric restrictions we want to place on the data rather than having 
to guess at it.  The disadvantage is that the theory may be wrong.  The fallout of the 
behavioral economics revolution in economics is that we are no longer particularly sure 
of what the right theory ought to look like, especially in as much as decision problems are 
concerned.  In particular, we are no longer secure in the presumption that utility functions 
and cost functions are somehow more stable and more universal than behavioral rules.  
Of course, as Professor Mookherjee notes, we could also structurally estimate behavior 
rules, but for that we would need a new body of theory.  In the meanwhile it is not clear 
that using the existing theory always dominates simply assuming an ad hoc empirical 
specification, but perhaps it is best to use the two approaches in tandem, using one to 
check on the other.14  
 
The bigger challenge to theory however comes from a different direction.  The 
most important role of theory in development economics, and indeed in all the rest of 
economics as well, is to help us understand what are the right questions.  The formulation 
of a testable hypothesis is only the final stage of this process, and one that is often left for 
the empirical researchers to do, since it often depends on exact nature of the data.  What 
is prior to that, and in some ways, even more important, is the ability of theory to locate 
the empirical results within a broader intellectual context and make us see why we ought 
to care.  In this sense, a lot of the best empirical work of the last decade or so can be seen 
as a response to a body of theory developed in the previous decade that made us really 
understand the implications of living in a world where neither markets nor governments 
work perfectly.   
 
What is unusual about the state of development economics today is not that there 
is too little theory, but that theory has lost its position at the vanguard: New questions are 
being asked by empirical researchers, but, for the most part, they are not coming from a 
prior body of worked-out theory.  The most intriguing results from empirical research 
today, as I see it, are not the ones cited by BBM, but results like those of Bertrand-
Karlan-Mullainathan-Shafir-Zinman (2004)  (the decision to take a loan is at least as 
influenced by whose picture is on the offer letter as it is by large differences in the 
interest rate),15 Karlan-Zinman (2004)(moral hazard in credit markets is a problem for 
                                                 
14 For a version of an approach that compares structural estimates with a randomized evaluation, see: Todd, 
Petra and Kenneth Wolpin (2003), “Using a Social Experiment to Validate a Dynamic Behavioral Model of 
Child Schooling and Fertility: Assessing the Impact of a School Subsidy Program in Mexico,” mimeo, 
University of Pennsylvania.  They however estimate the structural model without using the experimental 
data, and then use the experimental data just to confirm their structural results.  The problem with this is 
that the non-experimental estimates may be hopelessly biased but sufficiently ill-estimated to still be 
consistent with the experimental results.  It seems to make more sense to start from the experimental 
results. 
15 Marianne Bertrand, Dean Karlan, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir, Jon Zinman, “Pricing Psychology: 
A Field Experiment in the Consumer Credit Market”, mimeo, University of Chicago (2005). 
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men and not women, while for adverse selection it is the other way around),16 Duflo-
Kremer-Robinson(farmers say that they do not buy fertilizer because they have no 
money, and do buy fertilizer if it is brought to them while they have money in hand, but 
will not go and buy it at the local store), 17etc.  It is not just that we do not have a theory 
within which these results can be interpreted---it is not even clear how we would begin to 
build that theory.18  Indeed, the same goes for some less exotic results like Michael 
Kremer’s finding that teachers teach better when students are given an incentive to do 
well (2004),19 but not when teachers themselves are rewarded if their students do well 
(2001).20 
 
The point is not that these phenomena are more complex than what we are used to 
and therefore need a more sophisticated theory.  The problem is precisely that the correct 
explanation may not be particularly interesting or illuminating: Perhaps the borrowers in 
Bertrand-Karlan-Mullainathan just liked the picture and responded to it.  Maybe the 
farmers in Duflo-Kremer-Robinson had never thought of the possibility of going to the 
store when they had the money (which is a few weeks before they need the fertilizer).  
Could it not simply be that the students in Kremer’s study are better at getting the teacher 
to do what they want, than the teachers are in getting cooperation from the students?  
 
The challenge is to turn these explanations into a theory---something that would 
have implications for other things that we care about and pose new questions for 
empirical research.  I believe that it can be done, but to do this we need to give up trying 
to defend the existing theory (which has been incredibly successful in many ways) 
against an onslaught of seemingly random results that are coming out of the field 
experiments.  In Haavelmo’s terms (as described by Professor Mookherjee in the present 
issue) we are back at stage 1: We are gathering impressions that would eventually allow 
us to build a set of new theories that, one day, will define a “newer” development 
economics.   
                                                 
16 Dean S. Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2005. "Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information 
Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment," Working Papers 911, Economic Growth 
Center, Yale University. 
17 Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer and Jon Robinson (2004), “Understanding Technology Adoption: 
Fertilizer in Western Kenya, Preliminary Results from Field Experiments”, mimeo, Poverty Action Lab, 
MIT. 
18 For a discussion of why none of the existing theories help a lot in understanding the Duflo-Kremer-
Robinson results on fertilizer adoption, and the challenge it poses for development thinking, see Esther 
Duflo (2003), “Poor but Rational?” forthcoming in Abhijit Banerjee, Roland Benabou and Dilip 
Mookherjee (ed), Understanding Poverty, Oxford University Press.  
19 Michael Kremer, Ted Miguel and Rebecca Thornton (2004), “Incentives to Learn”, NBER WP 10971. 
20 Daniel Chen and Michael Kremer, “An Interim Report on a Teacher-Attendance Program in Kenya”, 
mimeo Harvard University. 
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In this brief note I would like to set down some of my thoughts on the issues 
raised in the EPW Symposium. My perspective is to see development economics through 
the lens of mainstream economics. My conclusion is that the balance between theory and 
empirics is an ongoing process, in economics no less than in development economics. No 
doubt the pendulum will swing this way and that, and each swing will bring about its own 
correction. The balance will tend to be restored. But the really big issues for development 
economics are also the big issues for economics as a whole—namely, those that arise 
from our adherence to methodological individualism in a framework of “rational” choice, 
and the use of overly simplistic economic analysis in policy making. These issues are 
neither solely theoretical nor empirical. But they are fundamental to economics and thus 
to development economics. Hence the title of this note. Goldilocks in the bears’ den 
found the right bowl of porridge for herself—not too hot, not too cold, just right1. She 
found the balance on porridge, but slightly neglected her fundamental predicament. 
 
Theory versus Empirics? 
 
The late David Champernowne, a British mathematical economist of rare 
distinction, was once asked how much mathematics is necessary in economics. “The 
amount of mathematics I know,” was his answer.2 There was a time when “mathematics” 
was associated with “theory” in economics. This is no longer the case. Mathematical 
techniques are as used in theoretical as in empirical economics, the techniques of 
mathematical statistics being prominent in the latter. The ground has shifted, since 
significant proficiency in mathematics and statistics is now the requirement in the best 
graduate economics degree programs in the world. Rather, it would seem, the major 
divide is now between using these techniques in theoretical versus empirical exercises. 
“The amount of theory I do”, might now be Champernowne’s apocryphal answer to the 
analogous question for modern times. 
 
In economics generally, the last fifteen years have seen a major shift away from 
the prominence that was accorded to theory in the preceding decade and a half. One 
indicator of this is the Clark medal of the American Economic Association, awarded 
                                                 
* Contribution to a Symposium, “New Directions in Development Economics: Theory or Empirics?”, 
forthcoming in Economic and Political Weekly, with contributions by Abhijit Banerjee, Pranab Bardhan, 
Kaushik Basu, Ravi Kanbur (Editor) and Dilip Mookherjee. 
** Cornell University. 
1 The term “Goldilocks economy” is often used for an economy that is nicely balanced between having too 
little aggregate demand and having too much. 
2 He told this story in his “mathematics for economists” lectures which I attended at Cambridge. 
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every two years to the most outstanding American economist under the age of 40. Of the 
last seven awards, only one was awarded to a pure theorist.3 Of the seven before these, 
five were awarded to pure theorists.4 This shift is reflected in the shift in graduate 
programs, and appointments in top Universities.  
 
Development economics, which has itself become more integrated into 
mainstream economics in the last thirty years5, has also followed this trend. After a long 
period of concentration on theory, research in development economics entered a strongly 
empirical phase around ten to fifteen years ago. This coincided with greater and easier 
availability of data, and of computational power. To take just one example, in the mid 
1980s there were only one or two African countries that had nationally representative 
household sample surveys. Now more than a dozen countries have such surveys, and 
there are several panel data sets covering households and firms for half a dozen or more 
countries. The situation was always better in Asia and in Latin America, but there too 
there have been improvements, sometimes inadvertently so—for example, the opening up 
of China in the late 1970s and 1980s led to the generation of many micro data sets. 
Added to this is the continued improvement, or at least the easier availability, of cross 
country data sets for developing countries that are at last nominally comparable—a good 
example of this is the Deininger-Squire data set on income distribution, which was made 
available worldwide through the World Bank, allowing a whole industry of cross-country 
regressions on inequality and growth to develop. The same is true of many other types of 
macroeconomic data sets that are easily available and easily useable. This is what leads 
Dilip Mookherjee to say: “Development economics is increasingly becoming an 
empirical discipline today.” 
 
Mookherjee characterizes four stages of research: Stage 1 is empirical description, 
Stage 2 is formulation of theory, Stage 3 is testing and Stage 4 is prediction and policy 
evaluation. The focus in the last fifteen years has been on Stage 3. Following where 
mainstream economics has led, development economics these days focuses greatly on 
testing, in particular the difficulties of inferring causality from correlation. This is the 
stuff of classical debates, like that between Keynes and Tinbergen, highlighted by 
Mookherjee. Mookherjee thinks that this focus is now tending to dominate the 
development discourse, and Bardhan and Basu agree. This is particularly true for two 
strands of the empirical literature—that which focuses on the search for instrumental 
variables, and that which uses experimental design of randomized evaluation. These take 
us to the frontier of empirical methodology in economics, and according to Banerjee it is 
this that explains, partly, why development economics is respected within the discipline 
of economics: “I think the fact that there is no special pleading for empirical work using 
developing country data is the reason why the brightest and the best among graduate 
economics students are coming into the field now.” 
 
                                                 
3 The awardees, in reverse order starting in 2005, were Daron Acemoglu, Steven Levitt, Matthew Rabin, 
Andrei Shleifer, Kevin M. Murphy, David Card and Lawrence Summers. 
4 The awardees, in reverse order starting in 1991, were Paul Krugman, David M. Kreps, Sanford J. 
Grossman, Jerry A. Hausman, James J. Heckman, A. Michael Spence and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 
5 For a detailed development of this argument, see Kanbur (2002) and Grusky and Kanbur (2005). 
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For both of these strands, it is not the fact of their existence that troubles Bardhan, 
Basu and Mookherjee, but rather its current preponderance in the journals. This attention 
to empirics may, according to Mookherjee and Bardhan, crowd out attention to a whole 
range of interesting theoretical phenomena, such as “…dynamic implications of factor 
market imperfections for individual agents…., interaction of economic processes with 
political institutions and social norms.”(Mookherjee), or “…how we can go beyond 
existing partial-equilibrium models of oligopoly to generate a viable theory of factor 
prices and income distribution in a generally oligopolistic economy;…the nature of 
transitional dynamics (as opposed to comparative statics) as we move away from 
traditional low-level equilibrium; …..” (Bardhan). 
 
In addition, and this is a charge particularly leveled against randomized 
experimental designs, that the very thing that makes inference “clean”, namely a specific 
controlled setting, makes any generalization from this inference problematic. This is the 
line taken in particular by Basu in his contribution to this symposium. But in his defense 
of this empirical method, Banerjee sets up the choice between one piece of evidence 
where the inference is clean, compared to several, from different locations and places, 
where the inference is problematic, and there is no doubt as to where he comes out: 
“…even if we have many low quality regressions that say the same thing, there is no 
sense in which the high quality evidence becomes irrelevant—after all, the same source 
of bias could be affecting all the low quality results.” Having said this, however, he does 
of course accept that having many randomized experiments in different locations and at 
different times is the way to build confidence in their results. 
 
Overall, my own sense is that the protagonists in this debate are not that far apart. 
Nobody would argue that the use of simple correlation to infer causation should be the 
modus operandi of empirical development economics. On the other hand, there is a 
tradeoff encountered as the environment generating the data is sufficiently controlled to 
make clean inference possible—in the extreme, the inference is valid only for that 
environment and no other. The role of theory in helping to make the best of this tradeoff 
is not disputed either. Fifteen years ago, there was clearly too little empirical work in 
development economics that met the current frontier standards in establishing inference. 
Fifteen years on, as the fruits of this empirical excursion have begun to be gathered, there 
is equally a need for theoretical perspective to make the best use of the empirical results, 
and to continue working on unresolved theoretical issues. Good sense will surely prevail 
and we will have both more theory and more good empirical work—a goldilocks solution 
for development economics. 
 
Watch Out for the Bears 
 
But, in my view, the real problems for development economics, as for economics, 
lie somewhat at a tangent to the balance between theory and empirics. The “theory” in the 
theory/empirics balance is none other than modern neoclassical economics, where there is 
recognition of various types of market and information failures, and outcomes and 
institutions are understood in terms of these imperfections. This is surely an advance on 
the general equilibrium theory of thirty years ago, which was not even thought to be of 
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much relevance to development economics. The integration of development economics 
into mainstream economics has been helped by the direction in which mainstream 
economic theory has moved, and it has to be said that this move is itself related to the fact 
that for economists like Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz, standard general equilibrium 
theory was very far removed from the realities of the developing countries. 
 
However, there remain two basic problems with the current state of development 
economics—one is in the realm of theory, the other in the realm of policy. In the realm of 
theory, the basic formulation of individual behavior, even in “Stiglitzian” models with 
imperfect information and so on, is one that satisfies the text book axioms of “rational 
choice.” The behavioral economics revolution in mainstream economics is bringing into 
question the empirical validity of these axioms, and thus raising questions for those sub-
disciplines, like development economics, public economics or labor economics, that are 
heavily dependent on the framework of standard rational choice. These questions, raised 
originally by empirical research in behavioral economics, are now being asked anew as 
similar findings emerge from the empirical development economics. As Banerjee notes in 
his commentary6: “The most intriguing results from empirical research today, as I see it, 
are not the ones cites by BBM, but results like those of Bertrand-Karlan-Mullainahan-
Shafir-Zinman (2004) (the decision to take a loan is at least as influenced by those whose 
picture is on the offer letter as it is by large differences in the interest rate),……Duflo-
Kremer-Robinson (farmers say that they do not buy fertilizer because they have no 
money, and do not buy fertilizer if it is brought to them while they have money in hand, 
but will not go and buy it at the local store), etc…..It is not just that we do not have a 
theory within which these results can be interpreted—it is not even clear how we could 
begin to build that theory.” Bardhan, Basu and Mookherjee also highlight the need for 
new departures from the current centre of gravity of development economics theory when 
they raise the question of the important role of norms in economic and social behavior. 
Bardhan further emphasizes the point when he says, “Methodological individualism 
which undergirds most of economics (including) the recent attempts to depart from 
postulates of self-interested maximization) may not be an appropriate principle when 
issues of group dignity and autonomy supersede individual oriented motivations.” 
 
The second major problem is not so much with development economics theory as 
with development economics policy analysis. No matter how sophisticated our theory and 
empirics become, it seems that the in the debates on great policy issues of the day—on 
exchange rates, trade policy, labor market policy, deregulation etc—simple “ECON 101” 
economics is very important. For many if not most policy analysts, the basic competitive 
model (and a partial equilibrium one at that) is the workhorse tool—it is the framework 
that slips most easily into mind when thinking about economic policy. Even some of 
those who made their names developing the theory of economic policy in a world with 
imperfections, tend to fallback on the simple policy prescriptions of “ECON 101”. The 
justification given is often of a political economy nature, that the more complex policies 
called for by modern theory (and empirics) are likely to be used and abused by special 
                                                 
6 See also Kanbur (2003). 
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interest groups. At the very least one can say that this position needs to be tested in theory 
and in empirics.7  
 
Thus even as we grapple with the perennial question of the right balance between 
theory and empirics, we should also focus on the fundamentals of the development 
economics we teach our students, and how policy makers use (or do not use) the 
development economics we teach. 
                                                 
7 This argument is developed further in Kanbur (2001, 2002). 
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